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Despite progress in cognitive neuroscience, we are still far from understanding the
relations between the brain and the conscious self. We previously suggested that
some neuroscientific texts that attempt to clarify these relations may in fact make them
more difficult to understand. Such texts—ranging from popular science to high-impact
scientific publications—position the brain and the conscious self as two independent,
interacting subjects, capable of possessing opposite psychological states. We termed
such writing ‘Double Subject Fallacy’ (DSF). We further suggested that such DSF
language, besides being conceptually confusing and reflecting dualistic intuitions, might
affect people’s conceptions of moral responsibility, lessening the perception of guilt
over actions. Here, we empirically investigated this proposition with a series of three
experiments (pilot and two preregistered replications). Subjects were presented with
moral scenarios where the defendant was either (1) clearly guilty, (2) ambiguous, or (3)
clearly innocent while the accompanying neuroscientific evidence about the defendant
was presented using DSF or non-DSF language. Subjects were instructed to rate
the defendant’s guilt in all experiments. Subjects rated the defendant in the clearly
guilty scenario as guiltier than in the two other scenarios and the defendant in the
ambiguously described scenario as guiltier than in the innocent scenario, as expected.
In Experiment 1 (N = 609), an effect was further found for DSF language in the expected
direction: subjects rated the defendant less guilty when the neuroscientific evidence was
described using DSF language, across all levels of culpability. However, this effect did
not replicate in Experiment 2 (N = 1794), which focused on different moral scenario, nor
in Experiment 3 (N = 1810), which was an exact replication of Experiment 1. Bayesian
analyses yielded strong evidence against the existence of an effect of DSF language on
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the perception of guilt. Our results thus challenge the claim that DSF language affects
subjects’ moral judgments. They further demonstrate the importance of good scientific
practice, including preregistration and—most critically—replication, to avoid reaching
erroneous conclusions based on false-positive results.
Keywords: closet dualism, “my brain made me do it,” moral responsibility, conceptual confusions in
neuroscience, moral scenarios, Double Subject Fallacy
INTRODUCTION
The neuroscientific study of voluntary action sparked an ongoing
debate, both inside and outside of academia, about the intricate
relations between the conscious self and the brain. How is
our conscious experience of deciding related to the neural
processes that mediate this decision? Does consciousness play
a causal role in the processes that lead to action? And, if it
does not, might our common notions of free will be nothing
more than an illusion (Libet, 1985; Wegner and Wheatley, 1999;
Wegner, 2002; Caruso, 2013)?
These discussions and debates were sometimes accompanied
by various conceptual confusions. As science has been providing
more insight into the human brain, scholars and the lay
public began shifting the way they describe the brain and its
relations to the self, not always appropriately. In popular science
books and debates, which commonly lay the foundation on
which lay perceptions of neuroscience are formed, the brain
is often described as separate from the self, and—critically—as
capable of interacting with the self while possessing opposing
psychological states to those held by the self (Damasio, 1994;
LeDoux, 2003; Gazzaniga, 2006; Frith, 2007; Rizzolatti and
Sinigaglia, 2008). But such writing is not limited to popular
science. It can often, and quite strikingly, be found in scientific
papers published in leading journals (Libet et al., 1983; Keysers
and Perrett, 2002; Pearson and Clifford, 2005; Cerf et al.,
2010; Simon and Gogotsi, 2010). (For a full discussion, see
Mudrik and Maoz, 2014.) Echoes of this type of writing can
also be found in the increasing use of neuroscientific evidence
in courtrooms (Garland and Glimcher, 2006; Chandler, 2016;
Meixner, 2016), typically as part of the “my brain made me
do it” defense (Morse, 2004; Gazzaniga, 2006; Sternberg, 2010;
Maoz and Yaffe, 2015).
We previously defined such writing, which separates the brain
from the conscious self and ascribes divergent psychological
states to them, as the “Double Subject Fallacy” (DSF; Mudrik
and Maoz, 2014). These psychological states can be more than
just divergent and even oppose one another (e.g., “the brain
knows our decisions before we do,” Gazzaniga, 2006). This type of
writing implies that there are two intentional subjects, the person
(or self) and the person’s brain, capable of interacting with one
another and having different mental states, like not knowing and
knowing, respectively. And so, both the self and the brain are
assigned with psychological predicates and intentional states, as
if these are two different subjects. We claim (also following the
mereological fallacy; Bennett and Hacker, 2005) that the DSF
is a form of conceptual confusion that stems from remnants of
Cartesian dualism in modern science, despite scientists’ repeated
claims to hold materialistic views. In this new “closet-dualism,”
the mind-body dichotomy is replaced by a self-brain dualism.
It is noteworthy that it is generally rather easy to eliminate
DSF language. For example, “. . .it seems the brain knows our
decisions before we do.” (Gazzaniga, 2006, p. 45) could be
rephrased as “. . .it seems that decision processes are carried out
unconsciously before we have conscious access to them.” It is
perhaps longer, but certainly more precise. Similarly, “Our brain
doesn’t tell us everything it knows. And sometimes it goes further
and actively misleads us.” (Frith, 2007, p. 47) could be rewritten as
“We don’t have conscious access to all the information processed
by our brains. And sometimes our conscious experience is further
actively misleading.”
In addition, we suggested that, rather than being cute (perhaps
humoristic) shorthand aiming to facilitate the understanding
of complex scientific texts, the DSF does the opposite (Mudrik
and Maoz, 2014). It adds unnecessary complications to the
already complex problem of mind–brain relations. We further
wondered whether it might bear practical implications for the
judicial system, to the extent that it lays the foundations for the
abovementioned “my brain made me do it” defense.
Indeed, decision making, inside and outside of the
judicial system, is held to be susceptible to (unconscious)
influences of irrelevant factors and preconceptions
(Houses of Parliament, 2015), which may include the DSF.
For example, numerous studies have focused on the effects
of physical, demographic, or personality characteristics of the
perpetrator, victim or the observer on blame or responsibility
attributions (for review of findings, see Alicke, 2000).
A prominent issue in this literature is race (e.g., Mazzella
and Feingold, 1994; Sommers and Ellsworth, 2000; Mitchell
et al., 2005, alongside physical attractiveness or socioeconomical
status; see again Mazzella and Feingold, 1994, as well as Devine
and Caughlin, 2014). Other factors, like negative pre-trial
publicity (Steblay et al., 1999, or stereotypical beliefs about
rape victims, for example, also influence decisions in case
simulations (Ellison and Munro, 2008). In addition, a large
study on the death penalty in Nazi Germany showed that
the death penalty was more likely to be given during times
when Nazi Germany suffered large numbers of battle deaths
(Geerling et al., 2017). Taken together, this body of literature
suggests that the assignment of guilt is often influenced by
irrelevant factors.
Here, we set out to examine if DSF language may play a
similar role in affecting guilt judgment in the judicial realm.
In three studies, we investigated whether people assign less
blame or guilt to defendants when their actions in moral
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scenarios are portrayed in textual vignettes using DSF language.
We hypothesize that subjects would be more lenient with a
defendant when her actions are described as “her brain made
her do X” as opposed to “her emotions made her do X,” for
example. Such a finding would demonstrate that DSF language—
which is in line with implicit dualistic notions of the brain as
separated from the conscious self—affects people’s judgment of
guilt in moral scenarios. Therefore, people may assign less moral
responsibility to agents in moral scenarios when DSF language
is used. This is, perhaps, because with DSF language the brain
would be viewed as an ‘external’ constraint that is put on the
conscious self. Such external constraints typically lead to judging
an action as less free, and—accordingly—lessening the moral
responsibility associated with it (Howard-Snyder and Jordan,
1996; Nahmias et al., 2006).
Previous studies have shown that generally using
neuroscientific language—irrespective of the DSF—affects
subjects’ judgments. Provided with neuroscientific evidence,
mock jurors list significantly more mitigating factors, or
reasons to reduce the severity of a charge or the length of
jail time, in their sentencing rationalizations (Aspinwall et al.,
2012). They are also less likely to sentence defendants to
life in prison (Greene and Cahill, 2012; see also Gurley and
Marcus, 2008) when any neuroscience-based evidence was
presented by the defendant. Accordingly, it has been suggested
that advances in neuroscience shape people’s perspective on
moral responsibility, causing them to value neuroscientific
over alternative forms of evidence (Greene and Cohen, 2004).
Therefore, it may very well be that using DSF language further
increases these effects, thereby lessening the moral responsibility
attributed to defendants.
To isolate the effect of the DSF from the more general
one of neuroscientific evidence, we presented subjects with
the same moral scenario that included evidence regarding
the neurological state of the defendant, while simultaneously
presenting neuroscientific evidence either using DSF language or
using neutral, non-DSF language. Perceived moral responsibility
was assessed by asking subjects to determine the guilt of the
defendant and, in the first experiment, to further recommend
jail sentences. We expected the implied dualism, inherent in
DSF language, to make subjects judge the defendants as less
morally responsible, or guilty, for their actions compared to when
non-DSF language was used.
EXPERIMENT 1
The first experiment was exploratory, aimed to assess the possible
effect of DSF language on judgments of moral responsibility.
It was a 3 × 2, between-subjects design, with culpability and
DSF language as independent variables, and attributed guilt
as a dependent variable. One moral scenario with varied facts
about the case represented different levels of culpability: the
defendant was either (1) clearly guilty, (2) ambiguous, or
(3) clearly innocent. The ambiguous scenario described an
inconclusive situation, in which the defendant was neither
clearly guilty nor innocent. Each level of culpability was
also presented using either (1) DSF language or (2) non-
DSF, neutral language. We first expected to find differential
judgments of guilt based on culpability, which served as a
manipulation check. But focus was on the comparison between
DSF and non-DSF language, where we hypothesized that
the former would lead to more lenient judgments of guilt
than the latter.
Methods
Subjects
A sample of 609 subjects (238 females; aged 18–75, mean
age = 32.25) was recruited using Amazon Mechanical Turk
(MTurk). (We predefined the sample to include 600 subjects but
ended up with 609 subjects due to the MTurk’s data collection
procedure.) This sample only included subjects who provided a
Worker ID that was identical to their MTurk Worker ID and
who additionally provided a valid completion code that matched
the code assigned to them at survey completion (see below).
This, and all other experiments reported in this study, were
approved through the UCLA Institutional Review Board (IRB).
In compliance with this approval, subjects were compensated 25
cents upon completion of the experiment.
Design, Apparatus, Stimuli, and Procedure
Culpability was manipulated to include three levels (guilty,
unclear, innocent). A pilot experiment suggested that the three
levels of culpability reliably led subjects to attribute three
corresponding levels of attributed guilt to the defendants for the
three vignettes. The case was either presented in DSF language,
or in non-DSF language. The guilt attributed to the defendants
was operationalized as subjects’ ratings of the defendant’s intent
to kill the victim. Additionally, subjects recommended jail
sentence, in months.
The moral scenario and corresponding questionnaires were
presented using the Qualtrics online survey tool and accessed
through an MTurk HIT. Unique 8-digit verification codes were
distributed on Qualtrics to be submitted on MTurk to verify valid
completion of the experiment.
The moral scenario involved bodily harm to the victim
and was presented alongside an overview of the necessary
criteria for an individual to be found guilty of assault with
intent to kill (Table 1). Then, subjects were provided with
three facts about the case and were informed that both
the defense and the prosecution have agreed upon these
facts. The first fact was consistent across all conditions,
and objectively stated the nature of the event in question
(Table 1, base scenario). The second varied, according to the
culpability condition, to reflect guilt, ambiguity, or innocence
of the defendant (Table 1, culpability condition). The third
referred to the neuroscientific evidence, and either used DSF
language or non-DSF language (Table 1, DSF condition). The
syntax and length of the descriptions were held constant
between DSF/non-DSF conditions to maintain the consistency of
the language used.
The vignette was followed by a field containing two 7-
point, discrete Likert scales. First, subjects were asked to
rate the extent to which they agree or disagree with the
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TABLE 1 | Experiments 1 and 3 vignette manipulation by condition.
Base scenario
Jim is being charged with vehicular assault with intent to kill. To be found guilty, it must be demonstrated that (A) he
struck another person with a vehicle and that (B) he intended to kill them. The established facts of the case, on which
the defense and prosecution agree, are:
1. Bob was struck by Jim’s car while Jim was behind the wheel. Bob was badly hurt.
Culpability condition
Second fact manipulated
Guilty Unclear Innocent
2. Just before Bob was struck, Jim yelled, “I’m going
to kill you, you bastard!”
2. Just before Bob was struck, Jim
accelerated through a red light.
2. Just before Bob was struck, Jim
slammed on the brakes and yelled, “Oh
no! I’m going to hit him!”
DSF condition DSF used No DSF used
Third fact manipulated 3. An area of Jim’s brain commonly associated with
aggression is more active than the average. So Jim’s brain
makes him have aggressive feelings more often than most
people. Jim often struggles with his brain and tries to
prevent these aggressive feelings from being expressed.
3. An area of Jim’s brain commonly associated with
aggression is more active than the average. So Jim has
aggressive feelings more often than most people. Jim often
struggles with himself and tries to prevent these aggressive
feelings from being expressed.
sentence “Jim is guilty of the charge of vehicular assault
with intent to kill.” There, 1 corresponded to “strongly
disagree” and 7 to “strongly agree.” Then, they were asked to
recommend a jail sentence, in months, from 0 months to a
life sentence (given in bins: 0 months; 1–12 months; 13–60
months; 61–120 months; 121–240 months; 241–420 months;
and life sentence).
Finally, subjects were asked to provide demographic
information: age, gender, and highest level of education
completed. Questions for all blocks were forced response, and
subjects were asked to enter the information to proceed to the
next stage of the survey. After all blocks were completed, subjects
were provided with a randomized, 8-digit, unique code to submit
to MTurk. The blocks had no individual time limit; however,
subjects had to complete the experiment within 8 min.
Analysis
A classical, null-hypothesis significance testing (NHST) two-way
analysis of variance (ANOVA) was run, with culpability and DSF
as factors. All analyses were complemented by a Bayes-factor
analysis to assess the conclusiveness of the results. Bayes factors
(BF), defined as the ratio of the probability of observing the
data given H0 and the probability of observing the data given
H1, were calculated using JASP (JASP Team, 2018) with default
settings. That is, for factorial analyses, we used the ANOVA BF
with Cauchy prior width of r = 0.5 for fixed effects and r = 1
for random effects. To compute BFs for the main effects and
interactions, we compared a reduced model in which the effect
of interest was not included with the full model, which includes
all main effects and interactions. To assess the strength of the
results, we adopted the convention that a BF < 0.01 implies
extreme evidence for lack of an effect, 0.01 < BF < 0.1 implies
strong evidence for lack of an effect 0.1 < BF < 0.33 provides
moderate evidence for lack of an effect, 0.33 < BF < 3 suggests
inconclusive data, or anecdotal evidence for lack or presence of an
effect, 3 < BF < 10 denotes moderate evidence for the presence
of an effect, BF > 10 implies strong evidence, and BF > 100
suggests extreme evidence for the presence of an effect (Lee and
Wagenmakers, 2014). The same analysis scheme was used for all
three experiments.
Results
As expected, the ANOVA revealed a main effect of culpability
[F(2,603) = 98.65, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.247, BF10 = 2.1 × 1034;
see Figure 1 (left) for the full results]. Subjects assigned higher
guilt to the defendant in the Guilty condition (M = 5.58,
SD = 1.36), followed by the Unclear condition (M = 4.39,
SD = 1.77) and the Innocent condition (M = 3.29, SD = 1.76). This
validated the culpability manipulation, and provided evidence
that subjects were following instructions and meaningfully
attending to the text.
Importantly, a main effect of DSF was also found, though the
Bayesian analysis suggested inconclusive or anecdotal evidence
[F(1,603) = 4.43, p = 0.036, η2p = 0.007, BF10 = 0.47]. Subjects
assigned lower guilt to the defendant in the DSF condition
(M = 4.28, SD = 1.91), than in the non-DSF condition (M = 4.56,
SD = 1.85). No interaction was found between the factors
[F(2,603) = 0.711, p = 0.49, η2p = 0.002; BF10 = 0.065].
For the recommended jail sentences, the ANOVAs revealed
a main effect of culpability [F(2,603) = 42.32, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.123, BF10 = 8.8 × 1014; see Figure 1 (right) for the
full results]. Subjects recommended longer sentences to the
defendant in the Guilty condition, followed by the Unclear
condition, and finally the Innocent condition. This further
validated the culpability manipulation, and provided evidence
that subjects were following instructions and meaningfully
attending to the text. However, there was no main effect of
DSF [F(1,603) = 0.01, p = 0.92, η2p < 0.001, BF10 = 0.091], and
subjects recommended similar sentences in the DSF and non-
DSF conditions. No interaction was found between the factors
[F(2,603) = 1.02, p = 0.36, η2p = 0.003; BF10 = 0.088].
Discussion
Experiment 1 provided first evidence for a possible effect of
DSF language on the way people perceive moral responsibility:
subjects who were presented with neuroscientific evidence
described in DSF language were more lenient in assigning
defendant guilt. This implies that DSF language might affect
judgments of moral responsibility, making people assign less
responsibility to others if “their brain made them do it” (Mudrik
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FIGURE 1 | Effect of culpability (guilty, ambiguous, and innocent) and DSF language (red for DSF and blue for non-DSF) on subjects’ attribution of defendant guilt
(left), and on recommended jail sentences (right). In black, central horizontal bars depict the mean ratings given by the subjects, and vertical lines reflect the standard
deviation. The radii of the circles represent the number of responses for each level in the 7-point Likert scale.
and Maoz, 2014). However, the effect we found was notably weak,
and inconclusive when using Bayesian analysis. Further, we found
no effect of DSF language on recommended jail sentences, and
there Bayesian analysis supported the absence of an effect. There
are at least two factors that could contribute to this. First, it is well
known that there is large disparity for sentencing for very similar
offenses (e.g., Austin and Williams, 1977). Second, subjects might
have found the presentation of sentences in months confusing.
We therefore decided to continue and test the effect of DSF
language specifically on guilt for another moral scenario. Finding
the DSF effect on perceived guilt in a different moral scenario
would provide evidence that the DSF effect is real and generalizes
to other scenarios. As there was no reliable effect of the DSF on
sentencing, we decided to examine the effect of DSF language
only on moral responsibility in the follow-up experiment.
EXPERIMENT 2
The main goal of Experiment 2 was to replicate the effect found
in Experiment 1, though on another moral scenario. In other
words, we aimed to assess both the reproducibility and the
generalizability of the effect. The current vignette again involved
bodily harm, yet by other means (throwing a heavy object instead
of vehicular assault; see Table 2). Given the results of Experiment
1, we expected to find both effects of culpability, validating
the manipulation and confirming that subjects were following
instructions, and—critically—an effect of DSF language. The
entire experiment—including sample size, methods, hypotheses
and analysis plan—was pre-registered in the Open Science
Framework (OSF1).
Methods
Subjects
Due to the small effect size in Experiment 1, we wanted to ensure
adequate power to detect an effect in Experiment 2. A power
analysis based on that effect size of Experiment 1 suggested
that to reach a power of 0.95 (with alpha = 0.05) we would
1https://osf.io/wj6my
need 1,794 subjects2. We collected subjects continuously until we
reached this pre-defined sample size after applying our exclusion
criteria (see below).
The experiment was again run using MTurk and Qualtrics,
open only to subjects who had not participated in Experiment
1. We further pre-defined exclusion criteria, based on the results
of Experiment 1, for subjects who: (a) rated the defendant in
the Guilty condition as a 1–3 (i.e., relatively not guilty) on the
7-point Likert scale for guilt; or (b) rated the defendant in the
Innocent condition as a 5–7 on the 7-point Likert scale for
intent to kill (i.e., relatively guilty), both suggesting they did
not understand the task; (c) indicated with a high rating (5–7)
that they regret their decision, or would like to change their
answers; (d) indicated with a low rating (1–3) of confidence
in their answers or that they did not feel responsible for their
decision (1–3); or (e) indicated a high level of familiarity (5–7)
with legal information by having taken a secondary education
course on the topic or knowing the definition of the term “mens
rea,” as subjects with legal knowledge cannot be regarded as lay
subjects for the purpose of this experiment. As in Experiment 1,
participants in this experiment also needed to provide a Worker
ID that was the same as their actual MTurk Worker ID, and to
provide a valid completion code that matched the code assigned
at survey completion.
We collected data from 6,537 subjects. The majority of
those subjects met the pre-defined exclusion criteria (which, in
retrospect, were too strict; see Experiment 3): 553 (8.5%) of the
collected subjects rated the defendant low in guilt in the Guilty
condition (criterion a); 315 (4.8%) rated the defendant high in
guilt in the innocent condition (b); 853 (13.0%) indicated high
regret or wanted to change their decision (c); 491 (7.5%) indicated
low confidence in their response (d); 2581 (39.5%) indicated
they did not feel responsible for their response (d); 2129 (32.6%)
indicated a high level of familiarity with legal information. There
2It turns out that we made a mistake when computing the required sample size
that would achieve power of 0.95 power. In fact, 1,794 subjects achieve only power
of 0.88. Though lower than we initially intended, this is still a reasonable power.
Moreover, the overall analysis that we carried out (see below), incorporating
subjects from all experiments, yielded the same results, suggesting that our
conclusions do not stem from lack of power.
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TABLE 2 | Experiment 2 vignette manipulation by condition.
Base scenario
Bob is being charged with battery with intent to kill. To be found guilty, it must be demonstrated that (A) he struck another person with an
object and that (B) he intended to kill them. The established facts of the case, on which the defense and prosecution agree, are:
1. Jim was struck by Bob’s flower pot falling from the third story window. Jim was badly hurt.
Culpability condition
Second fact
manipulated
Guilty Unclear Innocent
2. Just before Jim was struck, Bob yelled
at Jim, “I’m going to kill you, you
bastard!’
2. Just before Jim was struck, Bob
knocked the flower pot off of the
window ledge.
2. Just before Jim was struck, Bob tried
to catch the falling flower pot and
screamed, “Oh no! Look out!”
DSF condition DSF used No DSF used
Third fact manipulated 3. An area of Bob’s brain commonly
associated with aggression is more
active than the average. So, Bob’s brain
makes him have aggressive feelings
more often than most people. Bob
often struggles with his brain and tries
to prevent these aggressive feelings
from being expressed.
3. An area of Bob’s brain, commonly
associated with aggression, is more
active than the average. So, Bob has
aggressive feelings more often than
most people. Bob often struggles with
himself and tries to prevent these
aggressive feelings from being
expressed.
was some overlap in subject exclusion, yielding a final sample of
1,897 individuals (1,009 females, aged 18–82 years old; average
age = 35.89 years old± STD 11.91 years).
Design, Apparatus, Stimuli, and Procedure
All the above were identical to those used in Experiment 1,
besides the following changes (compare Tables 1, 2): (a) the
charge was changed from vehicular assault to battery, (b) the
names of the defendant and the victim were swapped, (c) the
first fact of the case was changed to “Jim was struck by Bob’s
flower pot falling from the third story window. Jim was badly
hurt,” and (d) the second fact was changed accordingly (Table 2,
culpability condition).
Following the moral scenario, the same 7-point Likert scale
was used as in Experiment 1, measuring perceived guilt. An
‘Additional Measures’ block was then presented, and subjects
were asked to rate (a) if they were confident in their decision,
(b) if they feel responsible for the outcome of the decision, (c)
if they regret their decision, and (d) if they would like to change
their decision. Then, subjects were asked to report their dualistic
intuitions: (a) if they believe that an individual and their brain
are separate entities, (b) if they believe that an individual and
their mind are separate entities, and (c) if they believe that an
individual’s mind and brain are separate entities. All the above
ratings were given on 7-point Likert scales ranging from 1 – “no”
to 7 – “yes.” Given the additional measures taken, time limits for
completing the entire survey was now set to 10 min.
Results
A two-way ANOVA with the factors culpability and DSF showed
a strong main effect of culpability [F(2,1891) = 1634.38, p< 0.001,
η2p = 0.63; BF10 = 4.64 × 10408], such that subjects had the
highest guilt ratings in the Guilty condition (M = 5.66, SD = 1.89),
followed by the Unclear condition (M = 3.13, SD = 1.63) and then
the Innocent condition (M = 1.72, SD = 0.83). The effect of DSF
language was not significant and negligible in terms of effect size
[F(1,1891) = 0.040, p = 0.84, η2p < 0.001; BF10 = 0.07]. Hence,
subjects had similar guilt ratings when the scenario was presented
in DSF language (M = 3.34, SD = 1.93), and non-DSF language
(M = 3.28, SD = 2.01). The interaction was also not significant
[F(2,1891) = 1.537, p = 0.2.15, η2p = 0.002; BF10 = 0.054]. Bayesian
analysis suggested there is strong evidence that DSF plays no role
in the attribution of guilt. Further, it suggested that the model
with the largest posterior probability given the data was the model
including only the culpability factor, with P(model| data) = 0.94.
Post hoc analysis revealed that the data and conclusions remained
qualitatively the same when not enforcing any of the exclusion
criteria. Therefore, it is unlikely that these results are due to the
high exclusion rate.
One potential explanation for the above results is the
following. It might be that the DSF language did drive subjects
to ascribe less guilt to the defendant. However, at the same
time, the following occurred. The DSF language nudged subjects
to more dualistic views, and those more dualistic view pushed
subjects to attribute more guilt to the defendant. Hence, these
two processes countered each other, resulting in no effect of
DSF language on guilt attribution. To test this, we carried out
additional post hoc analyses on the influence of subjects’ tendency
toward dualistic views on their attribution of guilt. Subjects were
overall non-dualistic, with only 9% reporting dualistic viewpoints
for each of the following questions: (1) Do you believe that
an individual and their brain are separate entities? (2) Do you
believe that an individual and their mind are separate entities?
(3) Do you believe that an individual’s mind and brain are
separate entities? Further, focusing on subjects who reported
either strong dualistic or non-dualistic views (6–7 or 0–1 for
question 1 above, respectively), we found no dependence of the
reported dualistic views on DSF language. An ANOVA with
DSF and culpability as independent factors and dualistic views
as the dependent factor revealed no effect for DSF on dualistic
views [F(1,1266) = 0.144, p = 0.71, η2p < 0.001]. (Running
similar ANOVA analyses on strong dualistic and non-dualistic
views according to questions 2 and 3 resulted in no significant
differences either).
To test whether dualistic views themselves influenced the
attribution of guilt, we performed Bayesian ANOVAs with the
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factors culpability, DSF language, and dualistic views. Model
comparisons identified the best model (and whether it included
the factor of dualistic views), and whether this model was better
than the other models (that is, the other models had BF10 < 0.33).
The first question about dualistic views did not appear to relate to
how people judged guilt. The best model included only culpability
as a factor [P(M| data) = 0.76], and the next strongest model,
which included also the factor of dualistic views, had a BF10 of
0.14 against the best model. The second question, on the other
hand, did appear to be related to how people judge guilt: the
best model included the main factors of culpability, and dualistic
views, as well as an interaction between these two factors [P(M|
data) = 0.60]. The next best model included only culpability as a
factor, and had a BF10 of 0.28 against the best model. Both the
main effect of dualistic views, as well as the interaction appear to
be mainly driven by an increase in perceived guilt in the uncertain
scenario in the group with dualistic views. Critically, however,
this did not have any bearing on the (null) effect of DSF. The
third question yielded results similar to the second question. The
best model included the main factors of culpability, and dualistic
views, as well as an interaction between these two factors [P(M|
data) = 0.64]. The next best model included the main factors of
culpability and dualistic views, and had a BF10 of 0.32 against
the best model. Again, both the main effect of dualistic views, as
well as the interaction appear to be mainly driven by an increase
in perceived guilt in the uncertain scenario in the group with
dualistic views. Thus, it seems like a more dualistic view is related
to stricter guilt judgments, when guilt (or its absence) is not
clearly defined by the text.
Discussion
As opposed to Experiment 1, Experiment 2 revealed no evidence
for the effect of DSF language on the assignment of guilt for
intent to kill—the effect was both negligible and not significant.
This null result was further corroborated by the Bayesian analysis,
which yielded strong evidence that DSF language has no effect
on the assignment of guilt for intent to kill. This mitigates
the concern that the study was not powerful enough to detect
the effect. In addition, the clear and strong effect of culpability
on assigning guilt for intent to kill, provides evidence against
explaining the results via some type of non-compliance of our
subjects with our instructions.
An interesting additional finding, however, was that a person’s
dualistic views may influence their assignment of guilt for intent
to kill, in ambiguous scenarios. Individuals who were more prone
to dualistic views perceived agents as guiltier in the uncertain
scenario. This could potentially provide an explanation to the
lack of DSF effect: Arguably, DSF language might have a twofold
effect. On the one hand, it makes the agent appear less guilty (as
this was ‘his brain’s fault’). But, on the other, it reinforces dualistic
intuitions, which appear to elevate guilt judgments. Critically,
however, the latter part of this potential explanation was not
borne out by our data, as we found no effect of DSF on dualistic
intuitions. Yet, again, this might reflect the insensitivity of our
measures for assessing dualistic intuitions here. Thus, future
studies are needed to better understand the relations between
dualistic thought, assigned guilt, and, potentially, the DSF.
Two alternative explanations for the lack of DSF should be
considered, however. One is that the results of Experiment 1
were a false-positive outcome. Another is that the DSF language
was less effective for this specific scenario, for some reason
yet to be determined. To decide between these two opposing
interpretations, we conducted Experiment 3.
EXPERIMENT 3
Given the conflicting results of Experiments 1 and 2, Experiment
3 was run as a direct replication of Experiment 1, again focusing
on perceived guilt. If the results of Experiment 1 proved to
be reproducible, the claim that DSF language might affect
judgments of guilt would be strengthened, though limited to the
specific moral scenario spelled out in Experiment 1. Alternatively,
if again an effect was not found, it would indicate that—
contrary to our theoretical suggestion (Mudrik and Maoz, 2014)
and hypothesis—DSF language might not affect the subjects’
assignment of guilt to defendants. Similar to Experiment 2, this
experiment—including sample size, methods, hypotheses and
analysis plan—was preregistered in the OSF3.
Methods
Subjects
The same sample size as in Experiment 2 was pre-defined
(minimum 1,794 subjects; 1,810 were collected of which 955 were
females; aged 18–80, mean± std age = 37.5± 12.3 years old). All
subjects were again gathered using MTurk and Qualtrics, with
the experiment open only to subjects who had not previously
participated in Experiments 1, 2 or in piloting. As this was a
critical replication study, we wanted to make sure that our data
was as clean as possible and that it included only subjects with
histories of valid survey completion. Hence, we opened the study
only to MTurk users that had previously completed 1,000 or more
surveys on MTurk with a 95% or higher HIT approval rating. We
further modified the exclusion criteria to avoid the strikingly high
exclusion rate in Experiment 2. Thus, we kept only criteria (a)
and (b) above (rating the defendant relatively innocent or guilty
in the Guilty or Innocent condition, respectively). Subjects who
provided a Worker ID that is different than their actual MTurk
Worker ID (61 excluded subjects) and subjects who provided
an invalid completion code or if the code they provide does
not match the code assigned at survey completion (11 excluded
subjects) were also excluded. We added an additional attention
check where subjects rated how not guilty the defendant was.
Then, subjects who rated the defendant as a 1–2 on the 7-point
Likert scale for guilt and also rated the defendant as a 1–2 on the
7-point Likert scale for no guilt, or conversely rated the defendant
as a 6–7 on the 7-point Likert scale for guilt and also rated
the defendant as a 6–7 on the 7-point Likert scale for no guilt
were excluded (176 subjects) as these answers were interpreted
as inconsistent. Overall, we collected 2,259 subjects, out of which
449 were excluded, yielding a final sample of 1,810 subjects.
3https://osf.io/a8cq2
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FIGURE 2 | Effect of culpability and DSF language on attribution of guilt for
intent to kill in Experiment 2. The annotations are the same as those
used in Figure 1.
Design, Apparatus, Stimuli, and Procedure
The moral scenario was identical to that used in Experiment 1.
However, several modifications were introduced. As previously
described, we added a question opposing the original measure of
perceived defendant guilt to test for consistency. Thus, the moral
scenario was followed by the following questions: (a) “How much
do you agree or disagree with the following sentence: ‘Jim is guilty
of the charge of vehicular assault with intent to kill”’ (1 – “strongly
disagree” to 7 – “strongly agree”; Experiment 1) and (b) “How
much do you agree or disagree with the following sentence: ‘Jim
is not guilty of the charge of vehicular assault with intent to kill”’
(1 – “strongly disagree” to 7 – “strongly agree”). This was used to
exclude inconsistent subjects (see above).
Similar to Experiment 2, an Additional Measures block
followed the moral scenario where subjects were asked to rate (a)
if they were confident in their decision, (b) if they regret their
decision, and (c) if they would like to change their decision on
7-point Likert scales (1 – “no” to 7 – “yes”).
Results
A two-way ANOVA with culpability and DSF revealed a main
effect of culpability [F(2,1804) = 1584.28, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.637,
BF10 = 2.1 × 10393, see Figure 3]. Similar to Experiment 1
and Experiment 2, subjects had the highest ratings of defendant
guilt in the Guilty condition (M = 6.04, SD = 0.87), followed
by the Unclear condition (M = 4.15, SD = 1.63) and then the
Innocent condition (M = 2.17, SD = 0.92). Yet—as opposed to
the results of Experiment 1, and in line with those of Experiment
2—no effect of DSF language was found [F(1,1804) = 0.563,
p = 0.45, η2p < 0.001, BF10 of 0.067], with similar judgments
of defendant guilt in the DSF language (M = 4.09, SD = 1.96)
and non-DSF language (M = 4.15, SD = 2.00) conditions. The
BF suggested that the null model was about 15 times more
likely than the alternative model, in which DSF would have
an effect therefore suggesting that the DSF did not have an
effect on subjects’ ratings of defendant guilt. The interaction
FIGURE 3 | Effect of culpability and DSF language on rating of intent to kill in
Experiment 3. Annotation is the same as that used in Figures 1, 2.
was trending, although non-significant, using traditional null-
hypothesis statistical testing [F(2,1804) = 2.75, p = 0.064,
η2p = 0.003]. However, a Bayesian analysis suggested moderate
evidence for the absence of an interaction (BF10 = 0.18). Overall,
the model with the largest posterior probability given the data was
the model including only the culpability factor, with P(model|
data) = 0.93. Post hoc analysis again revealed that the data and
conclusions remained qualitatively the same when not enforcing
any of the exclusion criteria.
We further checked whether the covariates age and gender
influenced the results. An ANCOVA4 revealed an effect of
culpability [F(2,1802) = 1576.79, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.636], no
effect of DSF [F(1,1802) = 0.584, p < 0.44, η2p < 0.001], and
no interaction [F(2,1802) = 2.76, p < 0.063, η2p = 0.003] on
subjects’ ratings of defendant guilt. Covariate effects were also
non-significant [sex: F(1,1802) = 0.459, p = 0.498, η2p < 0.001;
age: F(1,1802) = 0.794, p = 0.373, η2p < 0.001]. These results are
consistent with the ANOVA analysis reported above.
We also tested whether the effect existed only for some
subgroups of our subjects and was then washed out over the
entire population. This could have happened either because the
effect of DSF language was limited to a small subgroup, or
because the DSF language had opposite effects across different
subgroups and was then canceled out when they were combined.
In particular, we tested whether age or gender affect the DSF using
a linear regression. In other words, we regressed the attribution
of guilt on: DSF, age, gender, their pairwise interactions, and their
triple interaction. The overall regression reflected no significant
trends [F(7,1802) = 1.055, p = 0.39, R2 = 0.004]. Neither did any
of the variables exhibit significant trends (| t| < 1.65 and p > 0.1
4First, we tested whether the covariates were independent of the treatment effects
to ensure we could perform an ANCOVA. To that end, we performed ANOVAs
with factors culpability and DSF, and dependent variables age and gender. There
were significant effects of culpability on age [F(2,1804) = 3.591, p = 0.028,
η2p = 0.004], and DSF on gender [F(1,1804) = 4.49, p = 0.034, η2p = 0.002],
suggesting that covariates were not independent of the treatment effects. However,
due to the very small effect sizes, we decided to continue performing the ANCOVA.
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for all variables except the intercept). We therefore conclude that
demographic differences could not have explained our null result.
Finally, in this experiment the questions related to regret,
confidence, and the desire to change the decision were not used as
basis for subject exclusion. We therefore analyzed here (post hoc)
whether there were systematic differences in the responses to
these questions that were dependent on one of the factors in the
experiment. We found that confidence was affected by culpability
[F(2,1804) = 40.75, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.043; BF10 = 8.1 × 1014],
so that subjects were less confident (M = 5.13, SD = 1.42) in
the unclear condition than in the guilty (M = 5.80, SD = 1.18)
or the innocent (M = 5.58, SD = 1.33) conditions. There was no
effect of DSF language [F(1,1804) = 0.049, p = 0.83, η2p < 0.001;
BF10 = 0.054], nor an interaction [F(2,1804) = 1.22, p = 0.296,
η2p = 0.001; BF10 = 0.04].
Regret was also affected by culpability [F(2,1804) = 24.87,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.027; BF10 = 1.85 × 1014], so that subjects
reported more regret as guilt increased. There was no effect
of DSF language [F(1,1804) = 0.085, p = 0.77, η2p < 0.001;
BF10 = 0.056], nor an interaction [F(2,1804) = 3.052, p = 0.048,
η2p = 0.003; BF10 = 0.24]. A similar pattern was found for
the desire to change a decision, indexed by a main effect
for culpability [F(2,1804) = 23.22, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.025;
BF10 = 3.96 × 107]. There was no effect of DSF language
[F(1,1804) = 0.084, p = 0.83, η2p < 0.001; BF10 = 0.054].
There is a an interaction [F(2,1804) = 3.052, p = 0.048,
η2p = 0.002; BF10 = 0.077], though it is not supported by the
Bayesian analysis (and would not have survived correction for
multiple comparison).
Combining Data From All Experiments
Combining data from all three experiments, a two-way ANOVA
with culpability and DSF as factors revealed a main effect
of culpability [F(2,4310) = 2683.79, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.555,
BF10 = 5.97 × 10752]. The DSF factor was non-significant and a
Bayesian analysis provided moderate evidence against this effect
[F(1,4310) = 3.31, p < 0.069, η2p = 0.001, BF10 = 0.146]. An
interaction was also not found [F(2,4310) = 2.00, p < 0.135,
η2p = 0.001, BF10 = 0.04].
Discussion
The results of Experiment 3 align with those of Experiment 2;
no effect for DSF language was found. Even when collapsing the
results of all three experiments together (now including several
thousands of subjects), no effect was found, and substantial
(though moderate) evidence against the effect was obtained. In
the general discussion below, we suggest an explanation to what
appears to be a lack of effect of DSF phrasing on subjects’ ratings.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In this study, we ran three experiments to test whether phrasing
some facts about the actions of agents using the Double-Subject
Fallacy (DSF; e.g., “Bob’s brain makes him have aggressive feelings
more often than most people”) results in these agents being
perceived as less guilty, compared to when the same facts are not
phrased using the DSF (e.g., “An area of Bob’s brain, commonly
associated with aggression, is more active,” respectively). In the
first, exploratory, experiment we tested whether the DSF has an
effect on the perception of guilt in a hypothetical case of vehicular
assault. We created a moral scenario, manipulated to represent
increasing defendant culpability in a court case. Conditions were
designed to present the defendant as guilty, ambiguous, or as
innocent. Each culpability condition also included neuroscientific
evidence, either using DSF language or non-DSF language
(in a between-subjects design). We found a clear effect of
culpability on both subjects’ ratings of defendant guilt and on
their recommended jail sentences, validating our manipulation
and confirming that subjects included in the experiments were
reading the scenarios and following instructions. We also found
a significant, but weak, effect of DSF language on subjects’ ratings
of defendant guilt. However, there was no effect of DSF language
on subjects’ recommended jail sentences.
To test the replicability of this effect, and its generalizability to
other moral scenarios, we ran Experiment 2 (following a power
analysis and preregistration). There, we tested whether the DSF
has an effect on the perception of guilt in another moral scenario
involving bodily harm using the same experimental design. We
again found the expected effect of culpability but failed to find
an effect of the DSF language on the perception of guilt. To
understand these conflicting results, we ran Experiment 3 as
a simple replication of Experiment 1. We once more found a
strong effect of culpability, but not of DSF. This null result was
further supported by a Bayesian analysis that we conducted on all
three experiments collapsed together, which yielded even more
substantial evidence against the effect. The most straightforward
interpretation of our results is that DSF language has no effect on
defendant guilt assessment, and therefore moral responsibility, at
least for the moral scenarios tested.
Might it nevertheless be that the effect exists, yet we failed
to find it? Based on the power of this study, this appears
unlikely. The effect was only found in Experiment 1, which was
exploratory. Experiments 2 and 3 were designed following a
power analyses and both had power of 0.88, and sampled 1,794
and 1,897 subjects, respectively. Thus, the probability that we
would fail to capture the effects, if they were present, were 0.12
in each. As the two experiments were conducted on disjoint
subjects, computers, and times using different moral scenarios,
the joint probability that both experiments failed to capture the
effect when it was present is likely much lower, perhaps as low
as 0.12 × 0.12 = 0.014. Therefore, our study is unlikely to be
statistically underpowered.
Yet the DSF manipulation itself might be underpowered, of
course. And so, it could be that the differences between the
DSF and non-DSF language where too subtle, and accordingly –
did not evoke an effect. In an effort to make the conditions
comparable, sentence structure and length were held similar in
this study. But in courtrooms, arguments along the lines of “my
brain made me do it” (Morse, 2004; Gazzaniga, 2006; Sternberg,
2010; Maoz and Yaffe, 2015) could and would probably be made
much more explicitly. Thus, it is possible that the non-DSF
language may still show effects in legal situations, even though
we did not find it here.
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Finally, another option is that subjects found the DSF language
more confusing than non-DSF language, which might influence
their guilt ratings. Indeed, we previously claimed that DSF
language might not only preserve dualistic intuitions, but also
evoke confusion (Mudrik and Maoz, 2014). If this was the
case, this could have been reflected in the exclusion of more
subjects under the DSF than under the non-DSF condition.
Indeed, when comparing the exclusion percentages between
the two conditions, DSF tended to be excluded slightly more
than non-DSF: not confident of response, 7 vs. 8%; not feeling
responsible for outcome, 40.33 vs. 39%; not understand Guilty
condition, 25 vs. 25%; not understand innocent condition,
13 vs. 16%; regrets decision, 9 vs. 11.67%; wishes to change
decision, 7 vs. 9.67%; and legal knowledge, 31.67 vs. 33.33%;
for DSF vs. non-DSF, respectively. However, none of these
comparisons was statistically significant (binomial test, p > 0.31
for all conditions).
How are we to understand our results then? The results seem
quite conclusive: in the scenarios we presented, DSF language had
no impact on subjects’ assignments of guilt. The results of the
first experiment, accordingly, seem to be an example of a false-
positive. Of course, we should not over-interpret null results,
and it could still be that we failed to find the effect due to
some problem with our methods or design. Thus, we conclude
this paper by acknowledging that currently there is no evidence
that DSF language affects actual judgments of guilt. However,
this does not render our other claims against DSF (see again
Mudrik and Maoz, 2014) invalid; conceptually speaking, it is still
a confused form of writing, and—perhaps more importantly—it
is dualistic in nature. Thus, we still argue that to promote a clearer
understanding of the intricate relations between the brain and
the conscious self, scientists should avoid DSF writing. Further
studies should empirically examine the potential influences of
such DSF writing on subjects’ comprehension and on their
dualistic intuitions.
A final, unrelated, point about our study has to do with
the proper interpretation of preregistration studies, especially
given the widely discussed ‘replication crisis,’ both within and
outside cognitive neuroscience and psychology (Nosek et al.,
2015; Munafò et al., 2017). We initially discussed whether to
preregister the pilot study we carried out before starting it.
Had we done so, instead of treating it as just a pilot study for
future replications, we might have concluded that our results
bore out our hypothesis, that DSF language makes people
appear less guilty. Thus, preregistration by itself is not enough
to reduce the chance of obtaining false-positive results and
reaching erroneous conclusions. Two further things are worth
mentioning about this point. One is that preregistration should
come together with a power analysis, as we did in Experiments
2 and 3 here. There we know what the probability is of false-
positive and false-negative results. The second is almost trivial,
though important: preregistration is no substitute for replication
(Koole and Lakens, 2012; Nosek et al., 2012). An additional
methodological note refers to Bayesian analysis as compared
with traditional Null Hypothesis Statistical Testing; while the
latter indicated a significant result of the DSF manipulation in
Experiment 1, the former implied that this result is inconclusive,
and if anything – suggested that the data is more consistent with a
lack of effect (that is, the null result model was twice as likely than
the effect model). As the result of Experiments 2 and 3 indeed
suggest that an effect does not exist, this study demonstrates
the importance of Bayesian statistics in assessing the obtained
effects, or lack thereof (Gelman et al., 2014; Kruschke, 2014;
Vandekerckhove et al., 2018; Wagenmakers et al., 2018).
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